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Abstract
We compare three methods of motivating money in New Keynesian
DSGE Models: Money-in-the-utility function, shopping time and cash-
in-advance constraint, as well as two ways of modelling monetary policy,
interest rate feedback rule and money growth rules. We use impulse re-
sponse analysis, and a set of econometric measures of the distance be-
tween model and data variance-covariance matrices to compare the dif-
ferent models. We nd that the models closed by an estimated interest
rate feedback rule imply counter-cyclical policy and ination rates, which
is at odds with the data. This problem is robust to the introduction of
demand side shocks, but is not a feature of models closed by an estimated
money growth rule. Drawing on our econometric analysis, we argue that
the cash-in-advance model, closed by a money growth rule, comes closest
to the data.
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1 Introduction
How should one model money and monetary policy in quantitative analyses
of the business cycle? Within the broad paradigm of the The New Neoclas-
sical Synthesis (NNS) (characterized by monopolistic competition, price and
wage stickiness and sometimes by endogenous capital accumulation) there are
conicting approaches. Following Woodford (2003), many economists, such as
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2004), now do not model money explicitly at all
and incorporate an interest rate feedback rule with coe¢ cients estimated using
actual data. Others, e.g., Danthine and Kurmann (2004), incorporate estimated
money growth processes into their analyses and model the demand for money
explicitly (in their case as a cash-in-advance constraint). And there are a num-
ber of other variations along these lines which we mention below. However, the
literature is not very explicit regarding the di¤erences between modelling mon-
etary policy through an interest rate feedback rule and a money growth rule, or
indeed di¤erent ways of modelling the role of money in these models.
In this paper, we examine how the business cycle characteristics of the NNS
model depend on how we introduce money into the model and on how we model
monetary policy. Specically, we examine three popular ways to model the role
of money: (i) By postulating that real money balances enter the representative
agents utility function directly; (ii) by postulating that holding real money
balances helps the representative agent minimizes on shopping time, and (iii)
by postulating that the representative agents requires previously accumulated
real money balances to purchase goods. We also analyze the di¤erences between
modelling monetary policy through an interest rate feedback rule compared to
a money growth rule.
Comparing across variants of our models in this way raises some issues. How
does one carry out such a comparison? Often, researchers eyeball impulse
response functions and unconditional second moments. And although that will
play a role in what we do, we formalize this comparison. We employ a set
of econometric measures to ascertain which of our proposed specications best
matches the business cycle characteristics of the data. In addition, we also use
one of our distance measures to help us calibrate our models.
We nd that as long as we model monetary policy with an estimated Taylor-
type interest rate feedback rule, the NNS model will generate, in contrast to
the data, counter-cyclical ination and policy rates, regardless of how we model
money. This is a substantial drawback to this way of modelling money as it is of-
ten motivated by appeals to realism; that is, the interest rate is the instrument
of monetary policy and hence modelling monetary policy in this way is often
argued to be a natural choice. Under an estimated money growth rule, however,
both ination and policy rates become pro-cyclical. The magnitude of the corre-
lation is however only correct when the cash-in-advance constraint is combined
with a money growth rule. Our econometric methods allow us to rank the models
according to their ability to match the variance-covariance-matrix (VCM) of the
Hodrick-Prescott ltered model time series with the VCM of Hodrick-Prescott
ltered data. Overall, the cash-in-advance model with a money growth rule
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comes closest to the data. Money-in-the-utility and shopping-time models come
closer to the data under a money growth rule than under an interest rate rule.
As in Canzoneri et al. (2004), we nd that adding estimated government spend-
ing shocks does not improve the modelsability to match the data. Indeed, our
econometric analysis suggest that for most of our models, adding such a shock
actually takes the models further away from the data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out
our basic model and the di¤erent approaches to modelling the role of money.
Section 3 analyses two alternative ways of closing the models, rst using an
interest rate feedback rule and second using a money growth rule. Section 4
states our solution method and describes the calibration of the modelsdeep
parameters as well as the productivity, interest rate and money growth shocks.
Section 5 compares a set of key second moments generated by the models to
those generated by the data. Section 6 analyses impulse responses to monetary
and real shocks. In section 7, we set out our econometric methodology and use
these econometric techniques to rank the di¤erent modelsability to match data
in order to try to ascertain which specication o¤ers the best t. In section 8,
we attempt to improve the modelst by using the distance measure to inform
our calibration choices. Section 9 seeks to ascertain if the models t can be
improved by adding government spending shocks. Finally, section 10 concludes.
2 Di¤erent ways to model the role of money
Our starting point is a new Keynesian DSGE model with monopolistic compe-
tition and nominal rigidities in the goods and labour markets, along the lines
of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), but where rms produce di¤erentiated
goods using labour as well as capital services. In this section, we analyze several
ways of introducing money into our basic model. We rst discuss those aspects
of the model that are not a¤ected by the way we model the role of money and
that are therefore common to all versions of the basic model analysed in this
paper.
2.1 Representative rm: factor demands
Firms are monopolistic competitors who produce their distinctive goods accord-
ing to the following constant returns technology:
Yt(i) = F (At;Kt(i); Nt(i))  AtKt(i)sKNt(i)1 sK : (1)
Kt(i) is the capital stock which is predetermined in period t, and sK < 1. Firms
contract labour and capital in economy-wide competitive markets. The optimal
demand for capital and labour is given by (2) and (3) respectively
t = mctAt@Ft(i)=@Kt(i); (2)
wt = mctAt@Ft(i)=@Nt(i): (3)
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t denotes the economy-wide rental rate for capital and mct denotes real mar-
ginal cost. Equation (4) provides an equation for marginal cost:
mct = wth [Kt(i); Nt(i);At; sK ] : (4)
Capital accumulation is described by
Kt+1(i) = (1  )Kt(i) + 

xt(i)
Kt(i)

Kt(i): (5)
The initial capital stock, K 1(i); is given and assumed equal across all rms.
 () is strictly concave. An alternative formulation, sometimes employed, is
xt = x(Kt+1=Kt; )Kt. These formulations are equivalent since I()   1 (),
and hence is strictly convex. In addition to (5) optimal capital accumulation is
described by (6) and (7),
t = t
0

xt(i)
Kt(i)

; (6)
Ett+1t+1+Ett+1

(1  )  0

xt+1(i)
Kt+1(i)

xt+1(i)
Kt+1(i)
+ 0

xt+1(i)
Kt+1(i)

= t:
(7)
Equation (6) recognizes the utility foregone, t measures the marginal utility
of consumption, from investment at date t, taking into account the adjustment
costs noted above. (7) captures the dynamic properties of this trade-o¤; a
higher capital stock next period, ceteris paribus, enables higher consumption
next period, taking into account depreciation between this period and next,
and the discounted impact of next period adjustment costs.
At the economy-wide level, we have the following constraint which states
that all output is either consumed or invested:
Yt = Ct + xt
2.2 Representative rm: price setting
In all the variants of the New Keynesian models that we analyze, prices are
sticky in a time dependent manner. The rm will reprice in accordance with
the framework suggested by Calvo (1983). That is, if the rm reprices in period
t it faces the probability k of having to charge the same price in period t+ k.
The criterion facing a rm presented with the opportunity to reprice is given by
max
1X
k=0
()kEt
(
t+k
t
"
pt(i)
Pt+k

pt(i)
Pt+k
 
Y dt+k  mct+k

pt(i)
Pt+k
 
Y dt+k
#)
;
(8)
where the terms in marginal utility ensure that the price set is what would
have been chosen by any individual in the economy had they been in charge of
price-setting. The optimal price is given by
p0t(i) =

P1
k=0()
kEt

t+kmct+kP

t+kY
d
t+k
	
   1P1k=0()kEt t+kP  1t+k Y dt+k	 : (9)
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In the presence of economy-wide factor markets any producer given the chance
to reprice will chose this value. As a result the price-level in our models evolves
in the following way:
Pt =

(1  )p01 t + P 1 t 1
 1
1  : (10)
2.3 Labour markets
We follow the work of Erceg et al (2000) by assuming that labour is supplied
by household unionsacting non-competitively. Household unions combine in-
dividual householdslabour supply according to:
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt(i)
w 1
w di
 w
w 1
:
If we denote by W the price index for labour inputs and by W (i) the nominal
wage of worker i, then total labour demand for household is labour is:
Nt(i) =

Wt(i)
Wt
 w
Nt:
The household union takes into account the labour demand curve when setting
wages. Given the monopolistically competitive structure of the labour market,
if household unions have the chance to set wages every period, they will set it as
a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption. In
addition to this monopolistic distortion, we also allow for the partial adjustment
of wages using the same Calvo-type contract model as for price setters. This
yields the following maximization problem:
max
1X
k=0
(w)kEt
(
t+k
t
"
Wt(i)
Pt+k

Wt(i)
Wt+k
 w
Nt+k  mrst+k

Wt(i)
Wt+k
 w
Nt+k
#)
(11)
where mrs is the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption.
2.4 Representative agent: Money in the utility function
There are a large number of agents in the economy who evaluate their utility in
accordance with the following utility function:
Et

U(Ct;
Mt
Pt
; Nt)

 Et
(
C1 t
1   +


1  b (mt)
1 b  	N
1+
t
1 + 
)
(12)
Et denotes the expectations operator at time t,  is the discount factor, C is
consumption,M is the nominal money stock, P is the price-level, m is the stock
of real money balances, and N is labour supply.
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Consumption is dened over a basket of goods of measure one and indexed
by i in the manner of Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (13)
where the optimal price level is
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
: (14)
The demand for each good is given by
cdt (i) =

pt(i)
Pt
 
Y dt ; (15)
where Y dt denotes aggregate demand. Agents face a time constraint each period
(normalized to unity) such that leisure, Lt, is given by
Lt = 1 Nt: (16)
Agents also face the following ow budget constraint:
Ct + EtfQt;t+1dt+1Pt+1
Pt
g+mt = dt +mt 1Pt 1
Pt
+ wtNt +t +  t (17)
Here dt+1 denotes the real value at date t + 1 of the asset portfolio held at
the end of period t. Qt;T is the stochastic discount factor between period t and
T , and
1
1 + it
= Et fQt;t+1g
denotes the nominal interest rate on a risk-less one-period bond. wt denotes
the real wage in period t, and t is the real value of income from the corporate
sector remitted to the individual (e.g., think of rental income from the capital
stock along with a proportionate share in any nal prots). In addition to the
standard boundary conditions, the necessary conditions for an optimum include:
UCt(:) = t (18)
t = (1 + it)Et+1
Pt
Pt+1
(19)
UMt(:)
UCt(:)
=
i
1 + it
(20)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with both the consumers and the
rms optimisation problem.
6
2.5 Representative agent: Shopping time model
In this model we write our utility function, which is not a direct function of real
money balances, in terms of leisure, not labour:
Et fU(Ct; Lt)g  Et
(
C1 t
1   +	
L1 t
1  
)
(21)
we have the usual ow budget constraint:
Ct + EtfQt;t+1dt+1Pt+1
Pt
g+mt = dt +mt 1Pt 1
Pt
+ wtNt +t +  t (22)
in addition to a shopping time constraint:
Lt +Nt +H(Ct;mt) = 1 (23)
Shopping time, H(Ct;mt), depends positively on the level of consumption ex-
penditure and negatively on the consumers holdings of real money balances.
Money becomes useful because it allows the consumer to reduce the amount of
time spent shopping.
In addition to the standard boundary conditions, the necessary conditions
for an optimum include:
UC(:) = t [1 + wtHC(Ct;mt)] ; (24)
 wtHm(Ct;mt) = it
1 + it
; (25)
t = (1 + it)Ett+1
Pt
Pt+1
; (26)
Lt +Nt +H(Ct;mt) = 1: (27)
2.6 Representative agent: Cash-in-advance constraint
In this version of our model timing is important. In each period agents must
rst go to the money market and obtain cash needed for transactions in both
the consumption and capital goods markets. When the money market closes
the goods markets open. This specication follows Chari and Kehoe (1999).
Agents obtain utility from consumption and disutility from labour:
Et fU(Ct; Nt)g  Et
(
C1 t
1    	
N1+t
1 + 
)
; (28)
and face the usual budget constraint:
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Ct + EtfQt;t+1dt+1Pt+1
Pt
g+mt = dt +mt 1Pt 1
Pt
+ wtNt +t +  t:
Now, however, they also a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption and in-
vestment.
mt = Ct + xt;
which reects our timing convention that goods and money market transactions
occur sequentially in the same period.
The necessary conditions for an optimum are:
UCt(:) = t + 't; (29)
t = (1 + it)Ett+1
Pt
Pt+1
; (30)
't = t

it
1 + it

; (31)
mt = Ct + xt: (32)
Since the cash-in-advance constraint applies to both consumption and in-
vestment, the rst order conditions of the representative rm are a¤ected in the
following way:
t + 't = t
0

xt(i)
Kt(i)

(33)
where 't is the Lagrange multiplier on the cash-in-advance-constraint. The
remaining equations are unchanged.
3 Di¤erent ways to model monetary policy
We consider two popular ways of modelling monetary policy. First we consider
that monetary policy is modelled in terms of an interest rate feedback rule. The
monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to current economic
conditions. A common example of this specication is the Taylor rule, under
which the nominal interest rate reacts to current ination and the output gap.
Specically, we assume a Taylor rule with an additional interest rate smoothing
term. The log-linearized monetary policy reaction function takes the following
form:
it = iit 1 + t + y(yt   yt) + "i;t:
This approach is followed by inter alia, Canzoneri et al. (2004) and Nolan
and Thoenissen (2005).
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An alternative specication, used for example by Danthine and Kurmann
(2004), Kollmann (2005) and Wang and Wen (2005) assumes that the monetary
authority exogenously sets the growth rate of money, gM , such that supply of
real money balance evolves according to:
mt = (1 + gM )mt 1
Pt 1
Pt
:
The seigniorage from this activity is redistributed in a lump sum fashion to the
consumer yielding real money transfers of:
 = gMmt 1
Pt 1
Pt
:
4 Solving the models
We solve the models by taking a log-linear approximation around the determin-
istic steady state. The stochastic system of linear di¤erence equations is then
solved using the solution algorithm of King and Watson (1998, 2002).
4.1 Calibration
Our calibration is standard and is described as follows. We assume a discount
factor of 0:984, which yields an annualized steady-state rate of interest of 6:5%.
We assume that utility in each of our models is dened according to (12), (21)
and (28). The intertemporal elasticity of consumption,  = 1:5 and that of
the labour supply is 	 = 1: In the MIU model, we set b, the inverse of the
interest elasticity of money demand to 2:56 in line with Chari et al (2000).
We assume an elasticity of substitution between individual varieties,  = 7:67,
which yields a steady state mark-up over unit costs of 15%, a value commonly
used in the literature. We follow Erceg et al (2000) in setting the elasticity of
substitution between varieties of labour to 4.03, which yields a mark-up over
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure of some 33%.
We assume the probability that a rm can not change prices in a given period to
be  = 0:5, which implies that rm receive a signal to adjust prices on average
every 2 quarters. This lies between the commonly used value of  = 0:67 (every
3 quarters) as suggested by Canzoneri et al. (2004) and the much lower values
in Bils and Klenow (2004) who suggest a value of around 0:3 suggesting rms
change prices on average every 1.4 quarters. We assume that unions re-optimize
wages on average once every 4 quarters. On the production side of the model,
we assume an annualised depreciation rate of the capital stock of 10% and a
share of capital in production of 33%. The adjustment cost parameter, K ; is
chosen so as to match to the data the relative volatility of investment to GDP
generated by the calibrated models.
We summarize our chosen parameter values in Table 1
9
Table 1: Parameters of the models
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
 0.984 w 4.03
 7.67  0.025
N 0.67 K calibrated
L 0.33 sK 0.33
 1.5  0.5
	 1 w 0.75
4.2 Driving processes
There are two types of shocks hitting our model economies; there are shocks to
total factor productivity and there are monetary policy shocks, dened either
as shocks to the interest rate rule or shocks to the money growth rate. We
wanted to focus on the post-Volcker era as we think linearized models stand
the best chance of matching the data in this relatively stable economic period.
However, related studies such as Canzoneri et al. (2004) and others, suggest that
measured TFP over such a relatively short sample may be subject unduly to
cyclical factors, and we found this also. Hence, we opted to estimate TFP over
a longer sample period, whilst estimating our monetary policy rule (and shocks)
over the post-Volcker period. Estimating the monetary policy shock over the
whole sample period would have compounded our di¢ culties as we would have
run up against issues such as nominal regime shifts, as documented by Gavin
and Kydland (1999). These issues do not however apply when estimating the
money growth shock, as these are commonly estimated over the whole post war
period, see Danthine and Kurmann (2004) and Kollmann (2005) for example.
We measure total factor productivity by the Solow residual. We estimate
the Solow residual using quarterly US data from 1960 q1 through 2003 q4. We
estimate the following relationship:
lnAt =  lnAt 1 + "A;t;
where lnA the log of the linearly detrended Solow residual1 . The estimated
coe¢ cient  and the standard error of the equation are shown in Table 2
Table 2: Estimated Solow residual
 "A
0.94343 8.42410 3
(39.76)
To estimate a monetary policy feedback rule, we choose a shorter sample
period from 1984 q1 to 2003 q4. We estimate the following Taylor rule using
ordinary least squares:
1 In the appendix we provide details of how we constructed our Solow Residual.
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it = c+ iit 1 + t + y(yt   yt) + "i;t:
Our results are given in Table 3
Table 3: Estimated Taylor rule coe¢ cients
c i

(1 i)
y
(1 i) "i
0.000 0.937 1.506 0.4997 1.22510 3
(0.14) (35.24) (2.72) (3.17)
t-statistics are in parentheses.
We measure the growth rate of money by the log di¤erence of between period
t and period t-1 per capita US M1 money stock.
ln (1 + gMt) = [ln(M1t)  ln(popt)]  [ln(M1t 1)  ln(popt 1)]
and estimate the shock to money growth process using quarterly US data from
1960 q2 through 2003 q4 as:
gMt = c+ ggMt 1 + "g;t
Table 4: Estimated money growth rule coe¢ cients
c g "i
0.003 0.662 8.59210 3
(3.91) (11.67)
5 Unconditional second moments
Having solved the models, we now analyze the unconditional second moments
generated by the model economies for the di¤erent models and under the di¤er-
ent monetary policy frameworks. The second column of table 5 reports selected
second moments from quarterly US data for the period 1960:1 to 2003:4. Both
the data and the model output are logged and Hodrick-Prescott ltered.2 . The
appendix describes in detail our data sources and construction of data.
Models with interest rate rules. Columns 3, 4 and 5 contain the second
moments of the MIU, ST and CIA models. In each case we set the capital
adjustment cost parameter, K in such a way that the model generates a ltered
series for investment that is 3:19 times as volatile as the ltered series for GDP.3
The MIU and the CIA models are able to match the standard deviation of GDP
2The time series for the policy rate is only H-P ltered, not logged.
3We dene capital adjustment costs as (x=k) where x is investment and k is the capital
stock. The capital adjustment cost parameter is dened as: 
00(x=k)(x=k)
0(x=k) = K :
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for this calibration. The shopping time model is slightly more volatile than the
data following this calibration strategy. Whereas our calibration strategy aims
to match the relative volatility of investment, all models across both monetary
policy frameworks fail to match the relative volatility of consumption. Under
an interest rate rule, all three models do a reasonable job at matching the
volatility of hours, real wages and ination relative to the volatility of output.
All three models generate ltered time series for wage ination and interest rates
that are less volatile than the data. Cross-correlations between our variables of
interest and GDP have the correct sign for consumption, investment, hours,
real wages and wage ination, but the correct magnitude only for the rst three
variables. All three models generate counter-cyclical time series for ination and
the policy rate, whereas the data suggest a pro-cyclical relationship for each.
All three models under-predict the persistence of GDP, consumption, investment
and ination. Related work by Nolan and Thoenissen (2005) suggests that the
negative cross-correlation between ination and GDP may be attributed to the
presence of sticky wages, and that the counter-cyclicality of both the policy
rate and ination is robust to the introduction of rm-specic capital and/or to
changes in the Calvo parameter on prices.
A striking feature is how similar the second moments are for all three models
in the case of an interest rate feedback rule. This suggests that the di¤erences in
the rst-order conditions that arise due to the non-separability of consumption
and money in the utility function implied by the ST and CIA models do not
play a signicant role in the dynamics of the models. We now turn to the models
under the assumption that monetary policy is characterized by a money growth
rule.
Models with money growth rules. The MIU and ST models generate ltered
time series for GDP that are more than twice as volatile as the data, unlike
the CIA model which matches the standard deviation of GDP quite closely.
Compared to the models under an interest rate rule, the relative standard de-
viation of hours worked is too high (more volatile than the data) and that of
the real wage too low. The MIU and ST models match the relative volatility
of ination, whereas the CIA model is able to match the relative standard de-
viation of wage ination. Along these two dimensions, the money growth rule
comes closer to the data than an interest rate rule. Interestingly, this is also
the case for the interest rate, but only when a money growth rule is combined
with a cash-in-advance constraint. The models under a money growth rule over-
come the problem of counter-cyclical ination and nominal interest rates, but
yield a counter-cyclical real wage, which is in contrast to the data. Under a
money growth rule, only the CIA model generates cross-correlations that have
the correct sign for all variables analysed. Canzoneri et al (2004) argue that
the counter-cyclicality of ination and the policy rate suggests a missing or in-
correctly specied demand shock. Our analysis suggests an important role for
the way money and monetary policy are modelled.
The MIU and ST models generate even less persistence of GDP and its
components under a money growth rule than under an interest rate rule and
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Table 5: Data and model economies: 1960:1 - 2003:4
Data Interest rate rules Money growth rules
MIU ST CIA MIU ST CIA
K -9 -13.4 -8.2 -6.55 -6.6 -11.7
GDP 1.57 1.56 1.72 1.57 3.28 3.24 1.37
variable=GDP
Consumption 0.79 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.48
Investment 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19
Hours 0.92 0.83 0.9 0.84 1.40 1.42 1.17
Real wage 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.33 0.35 0.69
Ination 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.52
Wage ination 0.33 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.32
Interest rate 0.25 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.31
Corr(variable, GDP)
Consumption 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98
Investment 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Hours 0.88 0.73 0.79 0.73 0.94 0.94 0.63
Real wage 0.26 0.69 0.62 0.68 -0.29 -0.32 0.38
Ination 0.37 -0.19 -0.14 -0.19 0.75 0.75 0.30
Wage ination 0.18 0.65 0.70 0.63 0.95 0.95 0.65
Policy rate 0.36 -0.88 -0.88 -0.88 0.70 0.53 0.51
Autocorrelations
GDP 0.85 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.59 0.58 0.88
Consumption 0.87 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.83
Investment 0.90 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.57 0.58 0.90
Ination 0.30 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.33 0.32 0.50
are therefore even further away from the data. The CIA model generates more
persistence under a money growth rule than under an interest rule and comes
close to matching the rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of GDP and its
components, but somewhat overestimates the persistence of ination.
Overall, the MIU and ST models appear to be further away from the data
under a money growth rule than under an interest rate rule. The CIA model
however comes closer to the data under a money growth rule than under an
interest rate rule. Before we attempt to rank the models according to their abil-
ity to match the unconditional second moments of the data using econometric
techniques, the next section analyses and compares the short-run dynamics of
the models using impulse response functions.
6 Impulse responses
In this section, we use impulse response functions to analyze how our calibrated
models react to monetary policy as well as technology shocks. The calibration
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of each model, in particular the calibration of the capital adjustment cost para-
meter, corresponds to the calibration used to generate the moments summarized
in table 5. Throughout, the response of a variable in the MIU model is denoted
by a solid line (), the response of a variable in the ST model is denoted by a
dashed (- -) line and the response of a variable in the CIA model by a dotted
line (   ).
Monetary shocks in models with an interest rate feedback rule. We know
from table 5 that under an interest rate rule the di¤erent models produce very
similar second moments. This result is borne out by the di¤erent panels of gure
1. Apart from the demand for real money balances, the dynamics of output,
consumption, investment, employment, real wage, marginal cost, the policy rate
and ination are very similar across model specications. In response to an
unexpected cut in the policy rate, output and its components rise. Contrary
to VAR evidence, the response of these three variables does not, however, have
a humpshape such that the greatest e¤ect of a monetary easing occurs some
quarters after the shock. Marginal cost and ination also increase in response to
a monetary easing. Because prices adjust more frequently than nominal wages,
the real wage falls initially. Employment, which is demand determined, rises
along with the increase in output and the fall in the real wage. The policy rate
reacts endogenously to the interest rate shock. In response to the rise in ination
and a positive output gap, the policy maker raises interest rates following the
shock, but not by enough to stop the policy rate from falling relative to its
initial equilibrium value.
Technology shocks in models with an interest rate feedback rule. As in the
previous example, all three models display similar dynamics in response to an
increase in total factor productivity when monetary policy is modelled via an
interest rate feedback rule. In gure 2, output and its components rise in re-
sponse to a technology shock. Employment and the real wage also increase. The
humpshape of these response functions reects, to some degree, the autocor-
relation of the productivity innovation. A technology shock lowers the marginal
costs and thus ination. The policy maker responds to the fall in ination by
lowering the nominal interest rate.
The conclusion we can draw from our impulse response analysis thus far
is that in terms of short-run dynamics, the way we introduce money into our
models appears not to be crucial as long as we model monetary policy via
an interest rate feedback rule. Next, we analyze our three models under the
assumption that monetary policy is modelled by a money growth rule.
Monetary shocks in models with a money growth rule. Figure 3 shows that
when monetary policy is modelled by a money growth rule, an increase in the
growth rate of the money supply has signicantly di¤erent dynamic implications
for the cash-in-advance model than for the money-in-the-utility function or the
shopping time models. Unlike the CIA model, the dynamics of the MIU and ST
models are very similar to their counterparts in the interest rate rule models.
Importantly, in the CIA model the response of output, consumption, investment
and employment is humpshaped. The impulse responses suggest that it takes
several quarters for the maximum e¤ect of a monetary easing to impact on
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output and its components as well as on employment. The model does not
succeed at generating a liquidity e¤ect whereby the nominal interest rate falls
in response to a rise in money growth rate. Instead, the nominal interest rate
rises in response to a monetary expansion. A partial explanation of this response
is to be found in the response of ination. Compared to the MIU and ST models,
ination rises by less, and is more persistent, but is still highest in the initial
period of the shock.
Technology shocks in models with a money growth rule. Figure 4 shows im-
pulse response functions with respect to a 1% technology shock when monetary
policy is modelled by a money growth rule. Unlike for monetary shocks, the
CIA model does not display qualitatively di¤erent dynamics than the alternative
models following a technology innovation. Because agents need to accumulate
real money balances for consumption and investment purposes, output and its
components in the CIA model appears to be less volatile but more persistent
than its alternatives. Employment initially declines by more in the CIA model
than in the two alternative specications. Note also that the negative response
to employment is much more pronounced in the models under a money growth
rule than under an interest rate rule. Where the MIU, ST and CIA models
di¤er most is the response of the policy rate. Whereas the interest rate in the
rst two models barely reacts to a technology shock, the interest rate in the
CIA model declines on impact (similar in magnitude to its response under an
interest rate rule - see gure 2), and rises above its steady state value along the
adjustment path.
The main conclusion we can draw from our analysis of impulse response
functions is that the CIA model, when combined with a money growth rule
can generate humpshaped responses in output and its components following a
monetary shock.4 We nd that this humpshape arises only in the combination
of CIA and money growth rules. Taken individually, neither feature is able to
generate such a response. Our ndings mirror those of Wang and Wen (2005)
who also nd that the CIA constraint in conjunction with a money growth rule
can generate humpshaped responses of output to money growth shocks.
We have analysed the unconditional second moments as well as the impulse
response functions of three models across two monetary policy specications.
We have seen that under an interest rate feedback rule, it is di¢ cult to distin-
guish the thee models. We found that in a money growth rule specication, the
CIA model had certain desirable features not shared by either the MIU or the
ST models. Each model and specication appears to have advantages as well as
disadvantages that makes a ranking based on the current criteria di¢ cult and
imprecise. In the next section, we describe econometric methods to compare a
set of second moments of the model (capturing the variables we discussed in ta-
ble 5) with those of the data. Importantly, these methods allows us to compare
non-nested models with the data and with one another.
4Some of our (not reported) sensitivity analysis suggests that the hump shape in output is
less pronounced when the CIA constraint applies only to consumption and not consumption
and investment.
15
7 Comparison of models based on data andmodel
covariance matrices
Beginning with Watson (1993), there has been substantial research on formal
empirical validation of dynamic macroeconomic models based on the degree of
conformity in selected moments of the state variables, or second-order com-
parison over selected range of frequencies 5 . We use the empirical approach
proposed in Bhattacharjee and Chadha (2005) to select among di¤erent DSGE
models for the role of money, based on comparison of the variance-covariance
matrix (VCM) of the data with that of alternative competing models.
7.1 Measuring the distance between data andmodel VCMs
Our approach to measuring the distance between data and model VCMs is dis-
tinct from much of the literature and o¤ers several advantages in the current
context. First, the approach focuses on model selection rather than testing
model t, which is appropriate for assessing the t of falsemacroeconomic
models6 . This is in contrast to the use of formal hypothesis tests which im-
plicitly assume a state of the world where the model is at least nearly true
(Canova and Ortega, 2000). Second, existing methods are often di¢ cult to ap-
ply with calibrated models (not estimated using a likelihood-based approach),
or when the models are non-nested (Watson, 1993; Canova and Ortega, 2000);
our approach enables evaluation of non-nested and calibrated models, and is
therefore appropriate for the current application. Third, the methods explicitly
consider parsimonious models populated by a small number of shocks. Many of
the methods proposed earlier in the literature are di¢ cult to implement when
the model is rank-decient, i.e., having a rank lower than the number of state
variables (Watson, 1993). Finally, we use both measures that allow sampling
variability only in the data, as well as those admitting sampling variability both
in data and in simulations7 .
As described in Section 4, we solve the models using the solution algorithm of
King and Watson (1998, 2002), and estimate moments in the frequency domain.
The asymptotic matrix of second moments of the state variables estimated using
the King and Watson (1998, 2002) algorithm constitute the model VCM for each
of the models considered here. Our econometric framework accepts that all the
competing models are possibly false  hence, none of the simulated model
VCMs may be statistically indistinguishable from actual data, except in very
small samples. These competing models may not be nested within each other.
Further, being driven by a small number of shocks, the models will almost
certainly be rank-decient, in the sense that the model VCMs will have a rank
less than the number of state variables.
5See Canova and Ortega (2000) for a review, and Diebold, Ohanian and Berkowitz (1998),
Ireland (2004) and Bhattacharjee and Chadha (2005) for recent contributions to the literature.
6See also Diebold et al. (1998).
7See Canova and Ortega (2000) for a discussion. The relevance of this classication is
explained in further detail in Bhattacharjee and Chadha (2005).
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Denote by [0]mm the full-rank data VCM estimated using n data points;
(0) = m, where (:) denotes rank of a square matrix. [M1 ]mm ; [M2 ]mm ;
[M3 ]mm ; : : : are estimated asymptotic VCMs of competing models M1;M2;
M3; : : :. Since all our competing models are parsimonious, the model VCMs
are rank decient ( pj = (Mj )  (0) = m). In the following, we consider
a single model VCM, M , having rank p(< m) and describe measures of the
distance between this model VCM and the data VCM, 08 .
We use several distance measures to evaluate the various competing DSGE
models by the closeness of their simulated asymptotic VCMs to the VCM of the
data. These measures can be classied into three classes based on the nature
of sampling variability. First, we may consider informal or naive measures that
quantify the numeric proximity of the data VCM with various model VCMs,
without considering the nature of sampling variability. Second, we present
methods based on a testing approach that considers the asymptotic simulated
model VCM as given, and asks the question: Given sampling variability in the
data, could the data VCM have been generated by sampling using the computed
model VCM as the data generating process? Given that our models are false,
we expect the answer to this testing question to be negative, but we can still
interpret the p-value of the test, or the test statistic adjusted for the degrees of
freedom, as a measure of the distance between data and model VCMs. Third,
we assume sampling variability in both data and the simulations, and use the
notion of distance between distributions (such as the Kullback-Leibler distance)
to evaluate the validity of the di¤erent competing models.
7.1.1 Informal or Naive approach
Without any distributional assumption, we may informally measure the distance
between M and 0 by the Mean Absolute Errors (MAE):
MAE =
1
m2
mX
i=1
mX
j=1
jei;j j (34)
where e = ((eij))mm = M 0. This measure loosely formalizes the informal
comparison of moments commonly adopted in the literature, and as we have
conducted earlier in Section 5. The method has some possible limitations in
that (a) it does not admit any probabilistic comparisons, and (b) it gives the
covariances double the weight of the variances. On the other hand, the measure
is assumption-free and simple to use, and potentially useful for eye-balling the
di¤erences between the data and model VCMs. Root Mean Squared Errors
(RMSE) is another similar measure of distance; here we do not use this measure
since it is very similar to the Nagaos test statistic described below.
8An alternative strategy is to take a frequency domain approach and compare second-order
properties only over a selected range of frequencies (Diebold et al., 1998). While this strategy
is consistent with our framework, in this paper we focus on comparison of unconditional
moments of the state variables without decomposing variation across frequencies.
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7.1.2 Testing approach: Sampling variability in data but not in sim-
ulations
We explicitly take the view that all our competing models are false. Thus, in
the statistical testing problem
H0 : 0 = M versus H1 : 0 6= M ; (35)
we expect to reject the null hypothesis that the the data VCM is the same as
the model VCM, at least for large enough data. Nevertheless, we propose the
p-values associated with the test statistics as measures of the distance between
data and alternative competing models.
Note that the rank of the model VCM is given by the sum of number of
shocks in the model and the predetermined variables. Hence, since many of our
models are populated by a small number of shocks, we explicitly consider the
situation when the data VCM is full-rank, but the model VCM is not. Therefore,
we have a setup where, under H0, the estimated full-rank data VCM, b0;n,
asymptotically converges to the rank-decient matrix M .
The asymptotics of this setup can be motivated as follows. Under the null
hypothesis, M (and by implication 0) is driven by p(< m) sources of varia-
tion, which include the shocks in the model as well as predetermined variables.
However, at each nite sample size, all state variables may be subject to some
random measurement error which has a very small variance compared to each
source of variation in 0. Further, this variance decreases with sample size and
asymptotically goes to zero, so that the sequence of full-rank matrices b0;n con-
verges to the rank-decient matrix M . We consider stationary state variables
with zero means, and assume multivariate normality.
If M were full-rank, we could choose from a wide range of tests borrowed
from the statistics literature (Muirhead, 1982), among which Bartletts (1954)
B-test and Nagaos (1973) N -test are the most popular. However, since none
of our DSGE models is full rank, these tests cannot be directly applied to our
situation. We describe below a modication of Nagaos test to this situation.
Further, a modication of the Nagaos test for rank-decient situations has
been proposed by Ledoit and Wolf (2002). They show consistency of their test
statistic when the number of variables (m) is larger than the sample size (n  p),
and derive asymptotic distribution under the assumption that both n and p
increase to innity asymptotically. To the extent that this test is consistent in a
rank-decient setup, the Ledoit and Wolf (2002) test statistic can be very useful.
A particularly promising aspect of this test is its excellent performance, even
in very small samples (Ledoit and Wolf 2002, Tables 5 and 6). However, since
our DGP is di¤erent in that our population VCM is rank-decient by design,
the test is not consistent in this situation9 . Further. the asymptotic setup in
our case is fundamentally di¤erent from Ledoit and Wolf (2002), and therefore
the large sample properties are not similar. Here we propose a modication of
9See Bhattacharjee and Chadha (2005) for further details.
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the test for our setup using related research on singular Wishart distributions
(Uhlig 1994, Srivastava 2003)10 .
As described earlier, the reason the model VCM is rank-decient is because
it is parsimonious and driven by a small number of shocks and pre-determined
variables. Thus a good model VCM will approximately correspond to a data
VCM that is full-rank, but has only a limited number of large eigenvalues; these
eigenvalues (and corresponding eigenvectors) represent the main drivers of the
data VCM and correspond to the leading eigenvectors of the VCM of our good
model. Therefore, the idea behind our modications is to project the data VCM
onto a lower dimensional subspace which is spanned by the leading eigenvectors
of the model VCM. On this subspace, both the data and the model VCMs will
be full-rank, and can therefore be compared.
Following Srivastava (2003), we write the singular value decomposition of
M as:
M =
h
 
=
1mp :  
=
2m(m p)
i
:

pp 0p(m p)
0(m p)p 0(m p)(m p)

:
24  1pm::
 2(m p)m
35
=  
=
1:: 1; (36)
where  = diag (1; : : : ; p) is the diagonal matrix containing the p positive
eigenvalues 1  : : :  p of M , and the rows of  1 contain the corresponding
eigenvectors. Hence, under the stated null hypothesis (35), we have:
Ipp 0
0 0

=


 1=2
pp 0
0 0

:
24  1pm::
 2(m p)m
35 :M :
h
 
=
1mp :  
=
2m(m p)
i
:


 1=2
pp 0
0 0

=
  
 1=2: 1

pm
0(m p)m

:M :
h 
 
=
1:
 1=2

mp
0m(m p)
i
=
  
 1=2: 1

pm
0(m p)m

:0:
h 
 
=
1:
 1=2

mp
0m(m p)
i
=
" 
 1=2: 1:0: 
=
1:
 1=2

pp
0
0 0
#
:
Hence, the null hypothesis can be restated as:
H0 : 
(M)
0 = Ipp; (37)
10Srivastava (2003) uses the name pseudo Wishart matrices for the distribution of sample
cross-product estimated VCMs which are rank-decient by design, rather than because of
shortage of data.
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where

(M)
0 =

 1=2: 1:0: 
=
1:
 1=2

pp
can be estimated by
b(M)0 =  1=2: 1:b0;n: =1: 1=2;
using the singular value decomposition of the given rank-decient VCM M .
The above construction basically projects the full-rank data VCM onto the
lower-dimensional subspace spanned by the p eigenvectors of the model VCM
corresponding to the leading non-zero eigenvalues.
Bartletts, Nagaos and Ledoit-Wolf tests can all be modied to this new
testing problem. For the test H0 : 
(M)
0 = Ipp against the omnibus alternative
H1 : 
(M)
0 6= Ipp, the modied Nagao test statistic (Nnew) and Ledoit-Wolf
test statistic (Wnew) on the lower dimensional full-rank subspace dened above
are given by
Nnew =
1
p
:tr
b(M)0   Ipp2 ; (38)
np
2
:Nnew  2

p(p+ 1)
2

under H0 as n!1
and
Wnew =
1
p
:tr
b(M)0   Ipp2   pn:

1
p
:tr
b(M)0 2 + pn; (39)
np
2
:Wnew  2

p(p+ 1)
2

under:H0 as n!1
where tr(:) denotes trace of a square matrix.
Bhattacharjee and Chadha (2005) show that both Nnew and Wnew test sta-
tistics are consistent and have the mentioned asymptotic distribution when the
rank of the model VCM is xed as sample size increases. In certain situations,
one can imagine that as more data accumulates, the researcher may wish to
increase the complexity of the model. The modied Ledoit-Wolf test will be
consistent even in such a situation and have the stated asymptotic distribution,
so long as the ratio of the model VCM rank and the sample size converges to
a nite limit asymptotically. Further, Ledoit and Wolf (2002) demonstrate ex-
cellent small sample properties of their test, which also carries through in our
modication.
7.1.3 Distance between distributions: Sampling variability in both
data and simulations
Evaluation of models based on distances, such as the Kullback-Leibler Informa-
tion Criteria (KLIC), between distributions dened by data and model VCMs
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is not straightforward, since model VCMs are usually rank-decient (Watson,
1993). Bhattacharjee and Chadha (2005) propose a modication to the KLIC
by restricting attention to the subspace of the vector of state variables on which
the model VCM has a properdensity. Like the testing approach, we restrict
attention to a lower dimensional subspace of the state variables over which a
proper density can be dened.
The KLIC between the distributions of data (mean zero, VCM 0) and
model (mean zero, VCM M ) is dened as:
KLIC (0;M ) = Ef(:;0;0) ln
f(Y ; 0;M )
f(Y ; 0;0)
=
Z 1
 1
ln
f(y; 0;M )
f(y; 0;0)
f(y; 0;0)dy;
where f(:; 0;) is the density function of the multivariate normal distribution
with zero mean and VCM . However, since M is rank decient, f(y; 0;M )
is not a proper density; the density is zero almost everywhere.
As before, we consider the singular value decomposition of the model VCM
(Equation 36):
M = 1:e1:e
0
1 + 2:e2:e
0
2 + :::+ p:ep:e
0
p + 0:ep+1:e
0
p+1 + :::+ 0:em:e
0
m;
where p = (M ) < m is the rank of the model VCM, 1  2  :::  p are
the positive eigenvalues (elements of the diagonal matrix pp), and e1; e2; :::; ep
are the corresponding eigenvectors (columns of the matrix  =1mp).
Then, the density function of this rank-decient model (mean zero, VCM
M , (M ) = p < (0) = m) on the subspace spanned by only the p leading
eigenvectors is given by:
f

y
m1; 0;M

=
1
(2)
m=2
(1:2::::p)
1=2
: exp

 1
2
y0 My

;
where
 M = 1=1:e1:e
0
1 + 1=2:e2:e
0
2 + :::+ 1=p:ep:e
0
p
is the Moore-Penrose inverse of M . The density of the data VCM (full-rank)
is computed in the usual way, and therefore the Kullback-Leibler distance can
be computed.
Computational intensity can be an issue with the implementation of this
method. Following Bhattacharjee and Chadha (2005), we reduce computations
by estimating KLIC using a sampling approach, where the KLIC estimate is
obtained by computing sample means of log-likelihood ratios, using either a
Monte Carlo or a bootstrap sample from the actual distribution of the state
variables. Here, we present the estimates based on the bootstrap given by:
KLIC(BS) (0;M ) =
1
NBS0
NBS0X
i=1
ln
f(yi; 0;M )
f(yi; 0;0)
; (40)
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where the KLIC is estimated by a sample average of the log-ratios of the two
likelihoods taken over a bootstrap sample of size NBS0 drawn by resampling from
the distribution of the data. In practice, the bootstrap estimator may have an
advantage over the Monte Carlo estimator, in that it relies less heavily on the
Gaussian distributional assumption.
7.2 Taking the models to the data
We apply the above methods to measure distance between data and model
VCMs for our di¤erent candidate models. The state variables that we compare
across all models and specications are: logged and Hodrick-Prescott ltered
series for consumption, federal funds rate11 , investment, ination, hours worked,
GDP, real wages and wage ination. Selected results are presented in table 612 .
As discussed above, we intend to use the p-values from the two tests as well
as the estimated Kullback-Leibler distances to rank the models in terms of the
closeness of their VCMs with that from the data. Further, since we intend to
use the tests to conduct model selection among falsemodels, we also expect
the null hypothesis (that the data VCM is the same as the model VCM) to
be rejected in each case. In other words, we expect the p-value to be close to
zero. This indeed turns out to be the case, as the high values of the modied
Nagao and modied Ledoit-Wolf test statistics show (Table 6). However, since
all models and specications have the same degrees of freedom, we can rank
the models by the value of the modied Nagao and Ledoit-Wolf test statistics
(presented in Table 6), as well as by their respective Kullback-Leibler distances
and Mean Absolute Errors (MAE).
Table 6: Test Statistics
Interest rate rules Money growth rules
MIU ST CIA MIU ST CIA
KLIC(BS) 1328 (5) 1382 (6) 811 (3) 696 (2) 1016 (4) 22.9 (1)
Nnew 6.07e8 (5) 6.64e8 (6) 2.21e8 (3) 1.66e8 (2) 3.58e8 (4) 2.64e4 (1)
Wnew 6.02e8 (5) 6.06e8 (6) 2.20e8 (3) 1.65e8 (2) 3.56e8 (4) 2.61e4 (1)
MAE 4.8e 5 (2) 4.9e 5 (3) 4.7e 5 (1) 6.0e 4 (5) 6.0e 4 (5) 5.7e 5 (4)
A remarkable observation from Table 6 is the consistency between the three
econometric distance measures (KLIC(BS), Nnew and Wnew) in the relative
ordering of the di¤erent models. This observation demonstrates the strength
of the new measures of distance between data and model VCMs that we use
here. However, the informal/naive measure, MAE, generates quite a di¤erent
11 Interest rate series are H-P ltered but not logged.
12The gures in parentheses in the Table represent relative ordering of the di¤erent models
in terms of the relevant distance measure.
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ordering of the candidate models, indicating substantial benets to formal prob-
abilistic ordering of models in studies of macroeconomic DSGE models. Below,
we discuss the important ndings of our moment-based model selection exercise.
Across all models and policy specications, the cash-in-advance model in
conjunction with a money growth rule yields the lowest Kullback-Leibler dis-
tance as well as the lowest test statistics for the modied Nagao and Ledoit-Wolf
tests. As far as these distance measures are concerned it is the specication
whose ltered VCM comes closes to ltered VCM of the data. On the other
hand, the mean absolute error distance measure is lowest for the CIA model un-
der the interest rate rule. Our distance measures also suggest that it is di¢ cult
to distinguish between alternative ways of introducing money when monetary
policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule. This suggests that any
e¤ects of an ination tax associated with the shopping time and cash-in-advance
models may be rather minimal. When monetary policy is modelled via a money
growth rule, however, there are large di¤erences between models, with only the
CIA model yielding satisfactory results.
8 Using distance measures for calibration
In the preceding analysis, we calibrated our models using a common set of
parameter values, except for the adjustment cost parameter, which we chose
so as to match the relative volatility of investment generated by the model to
its value in the data. An alternative approach is to choose the adjustment
cost parameter to minimize one of our distance measures. Tables 7 and 8 show
distance measures and generated moments when the adjustment cost parameter
is chosen to minimize the KLIC (bootstrap) distance measure.
Table 7: Test Statistics: Choosing adjustment cost parameter to minimise KLIC
(bootstrap) distance measure
Interest rate rules Money growth rules
MIU ST CIA MIU ST CIA
KLIC(BS) 1230 1355 782 379 710 22.28
Nnew 5.74e8 6.34e8 1.97e8 4.06e7 1.68e8 2.24e4
Wnew 5.70e8 6.30e8 1.96e8 4.03e7 1.67e8 2.22e4
Based on our distance measures the ordering of our models remains roughly
unchanged. Just as in our previous calibration strategy, there is still very little
di¤erence between all three models under the interest rate rule. Under the
money growth rule, as well as overall, the cash-in-advance specication emerges
as the model that comes closest to the data.
Table 8 shows a selection of second moments for the alternative calibration.
Comparing the results from table 5 with those from table 8 suggests that even
though the alternative calibration comes closer to the data, none of the appar-
23
Table 8: Data and model economies: 1960:1 - 2003:4 adjustment cost parameter
chosen to minimise the KLIC (bootstrap) distance measure
Data Interest rate rules Money growth rules
MIU ST CIA MIU ST CIA
K -5.22 -6.45 -4.35 -2.59 -3.01 -50.42
GDP 1.57 1.42 1.54 1.41 2.42 2.50 1.39
variable=GDP
Consumption 0.79 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.69 0.66 0.39
Investment 3.19 2.75 2.65 2.64 2.23 2.38 3.62
Hours 0.92 0.77 0.83 0.81 1.36 1.41 1.17
Real wage 0.48 0.59 0.53 0.78 0.53 0.43 0.68
Ination 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.42 0.37 0.51
Wage ination 0.33 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.22 0.31
Interest rate 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.30
Corr(variable, GDP)
Consumption 0.86 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.94
Investment 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Hours 0.88 0.65 0.72 0.64 0.89 0.90 0.64
Real wage 0.26 0.73 0.68 0.73 -0.09 -0.16 0.37
Ination 0.37 -0.22 -0.18 -0.22 0.68 0.70 0.29
Wage ination 0.18 0.61 0.66 0.60 0.92 0.93 0.64
Policy rate 0.36 -0.88 -0.88 -0.88 0.49 0.35 0.54
Autocorrelations
GDP 0.85 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.64 0.63 0.88
Consumption 0.87 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.65 0.65 0.80
Investment 0.90 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.63 0.61 0.90
Ination 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.40 0.39 0.50
ent inadequacies of our model appear to be redressed by alternative calibration
of the adjustment cost parameter. The models under an interest rate rule still
generate counter-cyclical ination and policy rates and the MIU and ST models
under the money growth rule still generate a counter-cyclical real wage. Where
the last two mentioned models improve is in the volatility of GDP which is re-
duced, resulting in a lower relative volatility of investment, but a higher relative
volatility of consumption.
9 Demand shocks?
Given that the models under an interest rule still generate both a counter-
cyclical ination rate and a counter-cyclical policy rate, it has been suggested
that perhaps what is missing in this literature is a demand shock that moves
interest rates and ination in the same direction as output. To examine this
24
proposition, we follow Canzoneri et al. (2004) and add a demand shock in the
form of a shock to government spending. A shock to government spending enters
the model via the economy-wide resource constraint:13
Yt = Ct + xt +Gt
An alternative way of modelling a demand shock is via a preference shock that
changes the marginal utility of consumption. It can be shown that essentially
the two approaches are the same. In both cases the shock enters the consump-
tion Euler equation through the marginal utility of consumption.14 Given that
shocks to government spending are easier to measure, we proceed following
Canzoneri et al. We take Canzoneri et al.s estimated shock process, which is
estimated over almost the same time period as the rest of our estimated shocks.
Canzoneri et al. nd that the government spending shock has a persistence of
0.973 and a standard deviation of 0.01. We assume that the government spend-
ing shock is not correlated with either productivity or monetary shocks. Just as
in Canzoneri et al., we assume a share of government spending in GDP of 20%.
We choose K to match the volatility of investment relative to that of GDP, to
be consistent with our results of table 5.
Table 9 suggests that adding government spending shocks does not remedy
the counter-cyclical ination and interest rate of all three models under the
interest rate rule specication. Nolan and Thoenissen (2005) suggest that in-
ation becomes pro-cyclical when we drop the assumption of sticky wages, or
at least when wages are less sticky than prices. Table 10 allows us to answer
the question whether adding a demand side shock helps the overall t of the
models. Test statistics followed by a (*) indicate where a models t is improved
by the inclusion of a demand shock. It is straightforward to compare the t of
the baseline models (Table 6) with those of the models that include a govern-
ment spending shock using the KLIC distance measure. Based on this measure
we nd some improvement for the models under a money growth rule, but the
models closed with an interest rate rule are actually taken further away from the
data by adding our government spending shock. We can compare the modied
Nagao and Ledoit-Wolf test statistic by adjusting for the degrees of freedom
(df). The test statistics in table 6 all have a df of 16, whereas those of table 10
have a df of 21. Doing this conversion shows that the MIU and the ST models
closed with a money growth rule improve, whereas all other specications are
taken further away from the data. The MAE statistics can also be compared
directly between tables 6 and 10. Again we nd somewhat di¤erent results.
Here the ST and CIA under the interest rate rule as well as the MIU and ST
under the money growth rule improved.
13Government spending is assumed to be neither utility nor productivity enhancing.
14 If we model the shock as a preference shifter, we get the following linearised expression
for the marginal utility of consumption: [ y
c
yt   xc xt] + p(1   )^t = ^t, where ^ is the
preference shock and p is a parameter. When the shock is applied to the resource constraint
we can write the marginal utility of consumption as:  [ y
c
yt   xc xt] +  gc g^t = ^t
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Table 9: Data and model economies: 1960:1 - 2003:4 Monetary, Productivity
and government spending shocks
Data Interest rate rules Money growth rules
MIU ST CIA MIU ST CIA
K -6.8 -10.21 -6.23 -4.97 -5.02 -7.55
GDP 1.57 1.41 1.58 1.42 2.73 2.69 1.34
variable=GDP
Consumption 0.79 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.67
Investment 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19
Hours 0.92 0.82 0.89 0.84 1.39 1.43 1.18
Real wage 0.48 0.61 0.53 0.61 0.39 0.41 0.72
Ination 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.54
Wage ination 0.33 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.37
Interest rate 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.33
Corr(variable, GDP)
Consumption 0.86 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.94
Investment 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Hours 0.88 0.63 0.73 0.64 0.91 0.91 0.61
Real wage 0.26 0.70 0.64 0.69 -0.18 -0.22 0.39
Ination 0.37 -0.19 -0.15 -0.20 0.71 0.72 0.32
Wage ination 0.18 0.62 0.66 0.60 0.94 0.94 0.67
Policy rate 0.36 -0.88 -0.89 -0.89 0.60 0.43 0.50
Autocorrelations
GDP 0.85 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.62 0.61 0.87
Consumption 0.87 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.65 0.65 0.82
Investment 0.90 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.60 0.59 0.89
Ination 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.51
9.1 Pro-cyclical policy rate in the CIA model under a
money growth rule
A key nding of our analysis is the consistently good performance of the cash-
in-advance model when combined with a money growth rule. Our econometric
analysis suggests that this model best matches the data. One feature that
might account for the models success is the fact that, unlike competing models,
it yields both pro-cyclical ination and policy rate.
This subsection attempts to account for the positive correlation between the
policy rate and GDP. Our analysis of impulse response functions suggests that
the main di¤erence between the models closed via a money growth rule and
those models closed by an interest rate feedback rule lies in the response to a
monetary policy shock. If we model monetary policy via a money growth rule,
both output and the nominal interest rate rise in response to a positive shock
to the growth rate of the money supply, whereas output rises in response to
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Table 10: Test Statistics: Productivity, monetary and demand shock
Interest rate rules Money growth rules
MIU ST CIA MIU ST CIA
KLIC(BS) 1654 1680 988 538 893 22.13
Nnew 9.49e8 9.89e8 3.31e8 9.91e7

2.77e8 3.96e4
Wnew 9.43e8 9.83e8 3.29e8 9.86e7

2.76e8 3.92e4
MAE 6.01e 5 4.11e 5 5.90e 7 3.88e 4 3.87e 4 5.74 5
a decrease in the policy rate in the models closed by an interest rate feedback
rule.
Danthine and Kurmann (2004) point out that the CIA model (closed with
a money growth rule) fails to a generate a liquidity e¤ect whereby the nominal
interest rates falls following a rise in the real money supply, and suggest that
it is related to the counter-factual way in which monetary policy is modelled.
Unlike in most VAR studies, ination in our model does not have a hump
shaped prole in response to a monetary shock. If we compare the response of
the nominal interest rate to a monetary shock (Figure 3), we nd that the CIA
model generates a much larger increase in the nominal interest rate than either
the MIU or the ST models, which suggests an alternative explanation linked to
the cash-in-advance constraint. Indeed, in a cash-in-advance model an increase
in the money supply immediately raises both consumption and investment, as
the constraint on these two components of GDP is relaxed. In this way, a shock
to the growth rate of the money supply acts like the demand shock, which some
authors, including Canzoneri et al. (2004) have suggested is missing from the
standard NNS model.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we ask the questions: Does it matter how we model the role of
money in the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition, price and wage stickiness as well as endogenous capital
accumulation? And does it matter how we model monetary policy? It is well
understood that the NNS model when closed by an interest rate feedback rule
generates a counter-cyclical policy and ination rate, whereas the data suggest
that the two series are in fact pro-cyclical. One aim of our paper is to inves-
tigate if this shortcoming of the NNS model is related to the way we model
the role of money and how we model monetary policy. Our ndings suggest
that the counter-cyclical policy and ination rates are common to the money-
in-the-utility, the shopping time as well as the cash-in-advance versions of our
basic NNS model as long as monetary policy is modelled via an interest rate
feedback rule. On the other hand, when monetary policy is modelled via a
money growth rate, we nd that our NNS model generates pro-cyclical policy
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and ination rates. We also observe that in response to an unexpected increase
in the money growth rate the cash-in-advance model generates humpshaped
impulse responses for output, consumption and investment.
To answer the question as to which of the models and specications comes
closest to the data, we employ new econometric methods that allow us to com-
pare and rank nested and non-nested models against each other and the data.
The tests compare the variance-covariance matrix of the model economy with
that generated by the data. Our results suggest a clear and consistent ranking
of models. The cash-in-advance model in conjunction with the money growth
rule matches the data moments most closely, whereas the money-in-the-utility
model closed by an estimated interest rate feedback rule is one of the models
furthest removed from the data.
Finally, we examine if adding a demand shock can improve the t of the
models and resolve the counter-cyclical policy and ination rate issue encoun-
tered in some of our specications. We nd that adding a demand shock does
not resolve the counter-cyclicality issue and only improves the overall t of the
money growth rule models.
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A The data
Our data are of quarterly frequency and come from two main sources: the
US Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and US
Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and span the sample
period 1960:1 to 2003:4.
1. GDP refered to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is real GDP per capita from BEAs
NIPA table 7.1. Selected Per Capita Product and Income Series in Cur-
rent and Chained Dollars, seasonally adjusted. The series was logged and
H-P ltered.
2. Consumption referred to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is total consumption expen-
ditures deated by the relevant GDP deator, both from BEAs NIPA
tables 2.3.5 and 1.1.9.
3. Investment referred to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is real xed investment per
capita from BEAs NIPA table 5.3.3. Real Private Fixed Investment by
Type. Population is from NIPA table 7.1.
4. Hours referred to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is per capita hours worked in non-
farm businesses, from BLS, series code PRS85006033. Population is from
NIPA table 7.1.
5. Real wage referred to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is real hourly compensation from
BLS, series code PRS85006153.
6. Ination referred to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is dened as  = log(Pt=Pt 1),
where P is consumer price index for all urban consumers, from BLS series
CUSR0000SA0.
7. Wage ination referred to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is constructed using nom-
inal hourly compensation from BLS, series code PRS85006103 Wt. ! =
log(Wt=Wt 1).
8. Interest rate referred to in tables 5, 8 and 9 is the e¤ective US federal
funds rate.
9. Potential output used to construct the output gap measure in our esti-
mated Taylor rule is taken from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce measure
of potential output.
10. The Solow residual is constructed as follows:
At = ynfbt   sk log(Kt)  (1  sk) log(Nt)
where ynfb is the log of real GDP in the non-farm business sector, series
PRS85006043 from BLS. Nt is aggregate hours worked, as above, but
not deated by the population. K is real non-residential xed assets,
constructed following Stock and Watson (1999).
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions with respect to a -1% interest rate shock for the MIU model 
(solid), Shopping time model (dashed) and CIA model (dotted). 
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions with respect to a 1% technology shock for MIU model (solid), 
Shopping time model (dashed) and CIA model (dotted) under an interest rate rule 
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Figure 3:  Impulse response function with respect to a 1% money growth rate shock for the MIU 
(solid), Shopping Time (dashed) and CIA model (dotted). 
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Figure 4:  Impulse response functions with respect to a 1% technology shock for MIU model (solid), 
Shopping time model (dashed) and CIA model (dotted) under a money growth rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
